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Abstract—Supporting fast restoration for general mesh topolo-
gies with minimal network over build is a technically challenging
problem. Traditionally, ring based SONET networks have offered
50ms restoration at the cost of requiring 100% over-build.
Recently, fast (local) reroute has gained momentum in the context
of MPLS networks. Fast reroute, when combined with pre-
provisioning of protection capacities and bypass tunnels, comes
close to providing fast restoration for mesh networks. Pre-
provisioning has the additional advantage of greatly simplifying
network routing and signaling. Thus even for protected connec-
tions, online routing can now be oblivious to the offered protec-
tion, and may only involve single shortest path computations.
In this paper we are interested in the problem of reserving
the least amount of the network capacity for protection, while
guaranteeing fast restoration to all the supported connections.
We show that the problem is NP-complete, and we present
efﬁcient approximation algorithms for the problem. The solution
output by our algorithms is guaranteed to use at most twice
the protection capacity, compared to any optimal solution. These
guarantees are provided even when the protection is for multiple
link failures. In addition, the total amount of protection capacity
reserved by these algorithms is just a small fraction of the amount
reserved by existing ring based schemes (e.g. SONET), especially
on dense networks. The presented algorithms are computationally
efﬁcient, and can even be implemented on the network elements.
Our simulation, on some standard core networks, show that our
algorithms work well in practice as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern backbone and transport networks are highly com-
plex networks that strive to carry services with QoS guaran-
tees. These networks support general topologies and dynamic
routing of bandwidth guaranteed connections, yet at the same
time they aim to provide fast recovery from network fail-
ures. Traditionally ring based SONET networks have offered
50ms restoration to bandwidth guaranteed services, using pre-
reserved spare protection capacity and pre-planned protection
paths. Pre-planning protection in rings has been especially
attractive, because of the availability of exactly one backup
path between any two nodes, leading to very simple and fast
automatic protection switching mechanisms. However in ring
based SONET networks these advantages come at the cost of
reserving at least half the total capacity for protection, thus
requiring 100% redundancy.
Recently mesh based networks have received much attention
due to the increased ﬂexibility they provide in routing con-
nections, thus leading to more efﬁcient utilization of network
resources. Also mesh networks are appealing due to the high
degree of protection capacity sharing that is possible in these
networks, offering the promise of fast restoration recovery
for just a small fraction of the total capacity, reserved for
protection. Designing efﬁcient protection schemes for mesh
networks, that achieve the fast restoration times of ring based
SONET networks, and yet do not require the over build
generally associated with these networks, has remained a
challenging problem. In general most protection schemes,
including those for SONET and ring based schemes, have
been designed to protect against a single link failure. It is also
a challenging problem to design efﬁcient protection schemes
that protect against multiple link failures.
Recently, fast restoration for mesh networks has gained
momentum in the context of Multi-Protocol-Label-Switching
(MPLS) [5] networks. The MPLS fast restoration mechanism,
referred to as fast or local reroute [9], supports a local repair
capability, where upon a node or link failure, the ﬁrst node
upstream from the failure reroutes the effected Label Switch
Paths (LSP) onto bypass (backup) tunnels with equivalent
guaranteed bandwidths. Bandwidth guarantees are important
since it is the most likely reason for setting up QoS guaranteed
LSPs. Also, one way of incorporating other QoS constraints
such as end to end delays and losses is to convert these into
an effective bandwidth requirement, for the LSPs. The MPLS
fast reroute mechanism allows for bandwidth sharing between
bypass tunnels protecting independent resources, thus resulting
in efﬁcient capacity utilization.
Two different techniques for local protection in MPLS
networks have been proposed [16]. The one-to-one backup
technique [11] [1] [13] creates bypass LSPs for each protected
service carrying LSP, at each potential point (link or node)
of local repair. The facility backup technique [20] creates
a bypass tunnel to protect a potential failure point (link or
node), such that by taking advantage of the MPLS label
stacking mechanism, a collection of LSPs with similar backup
constraints can be jointly rerouted, over a single bypass tunnel.
In general, the one-to-one backup technique does not scale
very well with the number of supported protected LSPs, since
the number of bypass tunnels can quickly become very large,
not to mention the enormous load on signaling and routing
to support these extra tunnels. In addition, for implementing
the one-to-one backup technique, either extensive routing
extensions are needed to propagate the set of bypass LSPs
and their attribute information [1], resulting in heavy load
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of protection capacity is sacriﬁced, by limiting the amount
of state that is propagated in the routing updates [11], thus
requiring large amounts of spare capacity for protection.
The facility backup technique is free from many of the
drawbacks of the one-to-one backup technique. In addition,
when used in conjunction with pre-computation and pre-
reservation of protection bandwidth (and bypass tunnels),
facility backup can be implemented, without any or minimal
routing extensions [20] (In MPLS it is possible to pre-install a
set of bypass tunnels that may share protection bandwidth, by
assigning zero bandwidth [20] to each tunnel). Moreover, by
pre-reserving sufﬁcient protection bandwidth, it can be ensured
that all primary LSPs are protected, no matter how the primary
path routing is done, as long as the protection capacity is not
used for the primary paths. Thus pre-reservation helps simplify
network operations such as online connection routing which
can now be done oblivious to the offered protection. Moreover,
pre-reservation can be done by an off-line algorithm with the
complete knowledge of the network. This makes it possible to
maximize the bandwidth sharing among the bypass tunnels,
thus minimizing the total amount of capacity that needs to be
reserved for protection.
In this paper we study the problem of determining the
least amount of protection capacity (and the bypass tunnels)
to be reserved in the network, so as to guarantee fast local
restoration for the failure of any set of t ≥ 1 links. The solution
to the problem determines for each link, its bypass tunnels and
the amount of its total capacity to be reserved for protection,
so that its remaining capacity can be used for carrying working
trafﬁc. Thus, in our model (as in [20]) there are (at least) two
pools of bandwidth, one of which can only be used for carrying
working trafﬁc, and the other one is reserved for protection
(it may carry low priority best effort working trafﬁc that can
get preempted by a rerouted ﬂow, subsequent to a failure).
The pre-reserved protection capacities of the links belong to
the backup pool, and on a link failure its working trafﬁc is
rerouted, on at most k bypass tunnels, using only the available
bandwidth in the backup pool. The limit of k enables the
bypass tunnel information to be stored by the head nodes, of
the links, in their limited memories. We show that the problem
is NP-hard and we provide fast, computationally efﬁcient
algorithms, with bounded performance guarantees, for solving
the problem. As shown in [20] it is not very difﬁcult to support
a distributed implementation of these algorithms since the
algorithms only require the topology and the link capacities,
which are available to the LSR via LSA updates. Finally, we
also show how to update the pre-reserved backup bandwidth
and bypass tunnels to accommodate topology changes.
Even though the results presented in this paper are in the
context of MPLS networks, they are equally applicable to other
technologies (e.g. Optical, ATM etc.), where local reroute may
be used to provide restoration guarantees to service carrying
circuits, in mesh topologies. Unlike MPLS it may not be
possible to pre-install the bypass tunnels, computed by the
algorithm, into the network, due to the implicit protection
capacity sharing among the bypass tunnels. The pre-computed
bypass tunnels can however be signaled at the time of failure,
and the protection capacity needed for the signaled bypass
tunnel, is guaranteed to be available in the backup pool.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we present the background and related work. Section III
deﬁnes the problem and summarizes our results. In Section IV
and Section V we present efﬁcient algorithms for the prob-
lem and analyze their performance. Section VI talks about
implementation details, including how to handle changes in
topology. In Section VIII we talk about extensions and future
work. Section VII presents our simulation results.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In general the protection schemes for optical and MPLS
networks can be classiﬁed ( [13], [12]), based on whether the
protection is local (link based) or end-to-end (path based), and
whether the backup resources are dedicated or shared. Fast or
local reroute mechanisms, outlined earlier, are instances of link
based protection. In path based protection, the entire primary
service carrying path is backed up by alternate protection
paths, such that any failure on the primary path results in
its trafﬁc getting rerouted over its protection paths. In path
based protection the reroute is done by the end nodes of the
path. Compared to link based protection, recovery may be
slower in path based protection schemes, partly because failure
information has to reach the end nodes before restoration can
be initiated, and partly because even a failure of a single link
may effect primary paths of many different ingress egress
pairs, all of which may initiate path protection in parallel,
resulting in high signaling loads and contention for common
resources and crank backs.
The protection schemes can be further classiﬁed as be-
ing pre-planned (e.g. SONET) or event driven (dynamic).
The latter involves computing bypass routes and reserving
protection bandwidth at the time when the working path
is provisioned. These schemes rely on heavy signaling to
maintain the reservations and to effect the rerouting on the
failure of a link. These schemes although very efﬁcient in
lowering the over build tend to have longer restoration times.
Note that our scheme is based on pre-planning with the only
dynamic component coming from topology changes due to
which some protection capacities and bypass tunnels may need
to be re-computed and re-provisioned.
For pre-planned facility based fast reroute, the main ap-
proaches are through the use of rings in mesh topology. Once
the set of rings are identiﬁed then pre-planned protection
schemes as in SONET are employed. In some of these
approaches the network is designed in term of rings [18]
or by partially using rings [7]. Thus, these schemes are
only applicable to constrained topologies. Some of the other
protection schemes provide protection by embedding rings in
a mesh based topology. In these schemes each link is covered
by a cycle leading to a cycle cover for the network [7]. Each of
these cycles is provisioned with enough protection capacity to
cover the links that belong to it. On the failure of the link the
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surviving links of the covering cycle. There are two drawbacks
of this problem: one the over build can be signiﬁcant and
second it is hard to ﬁnd the smallest cycle cover of a given
network [19]. An improvement to these schemes are those
based on the notion of p-cycle [8]. Here the main idea is that
a cycle can be used to protect not just the links on the cycle
but also the chords (spokes) of the cycle, thus showing that
far fewer rings may be sufﬁcient for providing full protection.
An algorithm to minimize the total spare capacity, based on
solving an integer program over all possible cycles is given
in [8]. To the best of our knowledge no fast approximation
algorithms for this problem are known. An alternative to cycle
covers, intended to overcome the difﬁculty of ﬁnding good
covers, is to cover every link in a network with exactly two
cycles [6]. A set of cycles that meets this requirement is called
a double cycle cover [10]. For planar graphs, double cycle
covers can be found in polynomial-time. for non-planar graphs,
it is conjectured that double cycle covers exist, and they are
typically found quickly in practice. However, even for double
cycle cover based protection schemes, the required network
over build can be signiﬁcant. Note the all the ring based
approaches suffer from the drawback that after any topology
change, the structure of the solution may change dramatically,
thus limiting their scalability.
Non-ring based approaches to link restoration on mesh
networks is generalized loop-back [14], [15], where the main
idea is to select a digraph, called the primary, such that the
conjugate digraph, called the secondary, can be used to carry
backup trafﬁc for any link failure in the primary. [2] considers
the problem of ﬁnding the minimum cost augmentation of a
given primary network, so that the resulting network is capable
of supporting link protection under single link failures, for a
given set of links. In their model no limit is imposed on the
capacities of the links, and they provide a 4-approximation
algorithm when all links in the primary network have uniform
bandwidth and they provide a 10.87-approximation algorithm
for the general case. In addition [2] also provides a O(logn)-
approximation algorithm for the problem of jointly designing
the primary and backup networks. All the schemes mentioned
earlier assume that protection is provided for a single link
failure. [3] presents a heuristic for protecting against two link
failures, for link protection.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND OUR RESULTS
We are given a capacitated network in which pre-planned
facility based fast reroute is used to provide protection against
link failures. The link capacities are assumed to be integral
to model the number of ﬁbers or the smallest switchable
bandwidth on a link. The problem is to partition the link
capacities into working and protection capacities (both inte-
gral) to guarantee link restoration for the failure of any set of
t ≥ 1 links, with the goal of minimizing the total amount of
bandwidth used for protection. We also require that on failure
of a link the working trafﬁc of the link can be rerouted on at
most k bypass tunnels. In addition, we also consider keeping
the network protection capacities updated, as links are added
or deleted.
The problem described above is the most general version of
the problem considered in this paper. For ease of presentation,
we will describe the results mainly for a basic version of the
problem, and will give the main ideas, in Section VIII, as
to how the algorithm can be extended, to support the more
general version of the problem. In the basic version of the
problem, we assume that the network links have the same total
capacity in each direction (symmetric bi-directional links).
Thus, we can model the network as an un-directed network.
We also assume that there are no parallel links. Since parallel
links fail together, they can be replaced by a single link, of total
capacity equal to the sum of the capacities of the individual
parallel links. Given a network with integral link capacities
u(e) and an integer k, the problem is to ﬁnd for each link
e, an integral protection capacity 0 ≤ p(e) ≤ u(e), and a set
of at most k bypass tunnels B(e), for protecting link e with
bandwidth guarantees, such that
1) By reserving p(e) of each link e’s capacity for protec-
tion, the network can recover from single link failures
via link based local restoration. This means that on the
failure of link e its maximum primary (working) trafﬁc,
which is w(e)=u(e) − p(e), can be rerouted onto
its bypass tunnels B(e), and the reserved protection
capacity, on the surviving links, is sufﬁcient to meet
the bandwidth requirements of the bypass tunnels. Here
bandwidth sharing among bypass tunnels is assumed.
2) Each bypass tunnel of a link e, with r(e) ≤ k bypass
tunnels, must be able to support a rerouted trafﬁc of
approximately w(e)/r(e), on the failure of link e.I n
addition, all together these r(e) bypass tunnels must
be able to support the entire working trafﬁc on link
e. We will assume that on the failure of link e,a n
integral amount of trafﬁc is rerouted on each of its
bypass tunnels.
3) The total protection capacity

e p(e) is minimized.
The reason for constraining the number of bypass tun-
nels for each link (by the parameter k) and their minimum
bandwidth, is that in practice the network may support high
bandwidth connections (ATM VCs or MPLS LSPs etc.), which
cannot be split. Also, the head end nodes have only limited
resources to store paths of too many bypass tunnels. Finally, if
these tunnels cannot be pre-provisioned in the network, they
have to be setup subsequent to a failure. Thus, by limiting
the number of bypass tunnels per link, the desired recovery
times can be achieved. Thus, ideally k should be 1. However,
one advantage of having k>1 is that for larger values of
k, the total protection capacity needed is usually much less.
However, for most networks, the total protection reserved is
close to the best possible, even when there are at most two
bypass tunnels per link. We illustrate these observations with
an example.
Consider the 6 node graph given in Figure 1, with uniform
link capacities: u(e)=2 0units for all links e. It can be shown
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Fig. 1. A six node network
that when splitting is not allowed (k =1 ), an optimal solution
must set p(e)=w(e)=1 0 , for all links e, resulting in 90
units of total reserved protection capacity. Note that this is
a feasible solution, since on the failure of any link, say link
(1,2), its working trafﬁc of at most 10 units can be routed
on the protection capacity of a surviving path, say 1,0,3,2.
Also, it can be shown (Lemma 2 in Section V-A) that when
arbitrary splitting is allowed, then any solution must reserve at
least 60 units of total protection capacity. This bound is also
achieved with 2-splitting (k =2 ), where p(e)=w(e)=1 0 ,i s
set on the hamiltonian cycle 0,1,2,3,4,5 and p(e)=0is set
for all other links. In this case the, on failure of any link, say
(1,5), outside the hamiltonian cycle, its working trafﬁc, of at
most 20 units, is split equally among its two incident paths,
1,0,5 and 1,2,3,4,5 on the hamiltonian cycle. When a link,
say 1,0 on the hamiltonian cycle fails, its working trafﬁc, of
at most 10 units is routed on the surviving hamiltonian path,
1,2,3,4,5,0.
Thus in practice, 2 comes close to being the best value for k,
which is what we will assume in the rest of this paper. It can be
shown that when k is unbounded and arbitrary splitting of the
rerouted trafﬁc over the bypass tunnels is allowed (no limit on
the minimum capacity of the bypass tunnels), then the above
mentioned problem can be solved optimally in polynomial
time, using linear programming techniques. We show however
that with the constraints outlined earlier, our problem is NP-
complete.
One of our algorithms is applicable to networks where the
splitting of the rerouted trafﬁc is not allowed (ie. k has to
be exactly one). This algorithm is guaranteed to produce a
solution, in which there is no splitting of the rerouted trafﬁc.
However, as expected, this algorithm reserves more spare
capacity for protection. Our second algorithm may create two
bypass tunnels for some links in the network, but reserves
close to lowest protection capacity in the network. We show
that in the worst case both these algorithms produce a solution,
which reserves at most twice the protection capacity of the
optimal solution.
Putting our results in perspective of the existing schemes
described earlier, our algorithms may reserve only a fraction
of the total capacity of the network for protection. On the
other hand all the ring based schemes (with the exception
of p-cycle) and those based on generalized loop-back, may
reserve at least half the total capacity for protection. For
example, for a network with uniform capacities, n nodes and
m links, our algorithms may reserve at most n capacity for
protection, while most ring based schemes (including SONET)
will reserve m/2 capacity for protection. Note that m can
be arbitrarily large compared to n, depending on the average
degree of the network. We also show that changes in topology
can be easily handled with our solution, which is not always
the case for the existing schemes.
Our algorithms are very efﬁcient to implement which makes
it amenable to devices, such as network elements (e.g. LSR),
with limited computational resources.
IV. 2-APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present two fast algorithms, for the
problem of minimizing the total amount of pre-provisioned
protection capacity, and for computing the set of pre-installed
bypass tunnels, to ensure that the network is fully link pro-
tected. We establish that both the algorithms have the same
worst case performance. However, the two algorithms obtain
quite different solutions, where one algorithm reserves either
all or none of the capacity of every link for protection, while
the other one ensures that only a portion of any links capacity
is reserved for protection. Also, one algorithm only outputs
a single bypass tunnel per link, while the other algorithm
may require that on failure of some set of links, the trafﬁc is
rerouted over two bypass tunnels, resulting in much lower total
reserved protection capacity on the links. Thus, depending on
the needs of the service provider, one algorithm may be better
suited than the other. We show that the solution output by
both the algorithm, reserves no more than twice the protection
capacity reserved by any optimal solution.
Let the given undirected network be denoted by G =
(V,E), where V is the set of vertices and E the set of
bidirectional links. Recall that u(e) denotes the total capacity
of link e. We use the notation p(e) and w(e) to denote the
protection and working capacities on link e, as assigned by
the algorithm. Note that u(e)=p(e)+w(e).L e te1,e 2,...e m
denote an ordering of the links in non-increasing order of their
capacities. Thus, for i>j ,w eh a v eu(ei) ≤ u(ej).
A. Algorithm based on spanning tree construction
We assume without loss of generality that G is connected.
This is because otherwise the algorithm can be independently
run on each connected component. The algorithm maintains
an acyclic graph (collection of forests) T, where T initially
consists of only the nodes V , and on termination is a spanning
tree of G.A ts t e pi, link ei is considered, and if it does not
create a cycle in T then it is added to T. Thus, after m steps,
all links are considered and T is a tree. The algorithm then
sets p(e)=u(e), for all links in the tree and sets p(e)=0 ,
for all other links. Note that since there is never any working
trafﬁc carried on the links of T, there is no need to provide
any protection for a failure of any such link. Thus for these
links, there are no bypass tunnels. For a link e =( u,v), which
is not in T, its single bypass tunnel is the unique path from u
to v in T.
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trafﬁc on all links in the solution output by the algorithm is
link protected, thus establishing that the solution is feasible. In
other words, we show that if a link e with working trafﬁc w(e)
is cut, then its bypass tunnel is able to support a ﬂow of w(e)
unit. Thus, if e  is a link on the bypass tunnel for link e, then
we have to show that p(e ) ≥ w(e). However, since the links
on the bypass tunnel, are links in T,t h e yh a v ep(e )=u(e ).
Also, by construction, the links e that need protection are not
in T, and they have w(e)=u(e). Hence, we have to show that
p(e )=u(e ) ≥ w(e)=u(e). We prove this by contradiction.
So, let u(e ) <u (e).L e te =( u,v). Note that e  is a link
in the unique path from u to v in T. Since u(e ) <u (e),t h e
algorithm must consider link e before link e . Since, link e
is not added to T, there must exist a path connecting node u
and v in T, when link e is considered, and also when link e 
is considered. But then, adding e  to T would have created a
cycle. Hence e  cannot be in T, which is a contradiction. We
show later that the solution output by this algorithm uses no
more than twice the optimal protection capacity.
Enhancements: Note that the algorithm sets the working
capacity of the tree links to zero. If the the network is very
sparse, we can assign the working capacities for tree links as
follows. Assign a working capacity of   to all the tree links
and a protection capacity of   to the remaining links. It is
easy to see that as long as m ≤ 2(n − 1) the total protection
capacity will not increase and as long as   ≤ 1/2× capacity
of the lowest capacity link, the solution is a feasible solution
with k =1 . For example, this enhancement will assign half
protection capacity on all the links for a ring topology.
B. Algorithm based on 2-edge connected graph construction
We assume without loss of generality that G is 2-edge
connected. This is because, if there is a link e whose removal
disconnects G then no bypass tunnel is possible for link e.
Thus, link e can not have any working trafﬁc (w(e)=0 )
and thus, all its capacity must be reserved for protection
(p(e)=u(e)). Thus, after setting p(e)=u(e) and w(e)=0 ,
such a link can be removed from the network. By repeating
this procedure until there are no cut-links we can ensure that
the network has only 2-edge connected components, each of
which can be handled independently by the algorithm. Recall
that e1,e 2,...e m denotes an ordering of the links in non-
increasing order of their capacities u(e).
The algorithm starts from the tree T, created by the ﬁrst
algorithm, and adds more links to it, as follows. At all times
the algorithm maintains a connected graph F. F is initially
set to T. The algorithm considers the links ei not in T,i nt h e
order of increasing index i, and hence in the order of non-
increasing capacity. If while considering link ei =( u,v),t h e
nodes u and v are not 2-edge connected in F, then link ei
is added to F. We say a pair of vertices u and v are 2-edge
connected in F, if removal of any single link in F, does not
disconnect u from v. Note that, just after link ei is added by
the algorithm to F, there is a unique cycle Ci in F which
contains link ei, and all other links in Ci are from T.
For links in F, the protection capacity and bypass tunnels
are computed as follows. Let ei1,e i2,...e ik be the links added
by the algorithm to the tree T, arranged in opposite order from
which the algorithm considered them. Thus, i1 >i 2 >...i k,
and u(i1) ≤ u(i2) ≤ ...u(ik).L e tF1 = F be the graph
after link ei1 is added to F.L e tei1 =( u1,v 1).L e tC1 be
the (unique) cycle in F1 consisting of ei1 and the unique path
in T joining nodes u1 and v1. Note that by construction link
ei1 is the least capacity link on C1. Thus, for every link e
on C1,w eh a v eu(e) ≥ u(ei1).L e tC1(e) include the set of
tree (T) links of C1 which are not part of any other cycle
C2,...,C k.A l s ol e tei1 ∈ C1(e). The algorithm sets the
working capacity w(e) of all links e in C1(e) to u(ei1)/2.
Thus, the protection capacity of these links e in C1(e) is set
to u(e)−u(ei1)/2 ≥ u(ei1)/2. Note that by dividing by 2,w e
may violate the integrality assumptions. Hence, to be precise,
we need to take ﬂoor of the resulting value, for the working
capacity. However, in order to keep the presentation simple,
we will assume that all link capacities are even integers, and
thus we can omit the ﬂoors. All our results hold however,
even when link capacities are arbitrary integers. The algorithm
assigns a single bypass tunnel to every link e in C1(e), which
is the path obtained by removing link e from the cycle C1.
Next, all the links in C1(e) are removed from F1, to yield the
graph F2.
Let ei2 =( u2,v 2).L e tC2 be the cycle in F consisting of
ei2, and the unique path in T, joining nodes u2 and v2.N o t e
that C2 is also a cycle in F2, since none of the links in C2
are in C1(e).L e tC2(e) include all those links on the cycle
C2 which are not part of any other cycle C3,...,C k.A l s o
let ei2 ∈ C2(e). As before the algorithm sets the protection
capacity of these links e in C2(e) to u(e) − u(ei2)/2.T h e
algorithm assigns a single bypass tunnel to every link e in
C2(e), which is the path obtained by removing link e from
cycle C2. Next the links in C2(e) are removed from F2,t o
yield the graph F3 and the same procedure is continued for all
the graphs F3,F 4,...F k. Note that graph Fk+1 has no links,
since every link of F is in one of the cycles C1,C 2,...C k.
The algorithm sets the protection capacity of all the links,
which are not in F, to zero. Each of these links e is assigned
two bypass tunnels, as follows. Let e =( u,v). Note that when
e is considered by the algorithm (while constructing F), nodes
u and v are 2-edge connected in F (that is why e is not in
F). Thus, when e is considered by the algorithm, there must
exist two link disjoint paths between u and v in F.T h et w o
bypass tunnels for link e are these two paths.
We illustrate the algorithm using Figure 2. Here, each link
has two labels, the ﬁrst one is its total capacity and the second
one is its protection capacity, as set by the algorithm. The
maximum cost spanning tree T, as found by the algorithm, is
shown in thick solid lines. F is initially set to T. Next, the
algorithm considers the remaining links in the decreasing order
of their capacities (i.e links (1,2), (2,4), (1,5) and (3,4)).
Links (1,2) and (2,4) are added to F in that order, since
their end points are not 2-edge connected in F. Links (1,5)
and (3,4) are not added to F, since their end points are 2-
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Fig. 2. A six node network showing the capacities
edge connected in F, when they are considered. F1 is set to F.
Now we consider link (2,4). The unique cycle C1 containing
this link and tree (T) links is 2 − 3 − 0 − 5 − 4 − 2. Links
(0,5) and (4,5) are only on cycle C1 in F1.S ow es e tt h e
working capacities of each of these links, including link (2,4),
equal to 1/2× capacity of link (2,4), which is 4.N e x t ,F2 is
obtained by removing links (2,4),(0,5) and (4,5) from F1.
For link (1,2), the unique cycle C2 is 1−0−3−2−1. Since,
all these links are part of only one cycle in F2, each of these
links working capacity is set to half of capacity of link (1,2),
which is 4. All links outside F have their protection capacity
set to 0.
1) Validity of the Algorithm: We ﬁrst show that the graph
F output by the algorithm is 2-edge connected. Note that, if
there is a cut-link (u,v) in F, then (u,v) must also be in T
(since u and v must be connected in T). Since, G is assumed
to be 2-edge connected, there must be some link ej in G,
which is not in T or F, which when added to T, must create
a cycle containing link (u,v).L e tej be such a link, with the
smallest index j. Then, link ej must have been considered by
this algorithm, and at the time when it is considered by the
algorithm, u and v cannot be 2-edge connected in F. Hence,
the algorithm must add ej to F. But then (u,v) cannot be
a cut-link of F, a contradiction. Now we show that in F all
links are protected.
Lemma 1: The algorithm outputs a feasible solution, in
which the working capacity of all links is protected.
Proof: We ﬁrst show that on any link in F, at least half of
its capacity is reserved for protection. This holds trivially for
the links in F, that are not in T. For a link e in T, its protection
capacity is assigned by the algorithm, while considering some
link eij, and some cycle Cj, such that e is in Cj(e). Note that
since e is in T,w eh a v eu(e) ≥ u(eij). By construction links
e’s protection capacity is set to u(e) − u(eij)/2 ≥ u(e)/2,
thus implying the result.
Next, we show that the links of Cj,1 ≤ j ≤ k, in the above
description of the algorithm, have at least u(eij)/2 capacity
reserved for protection. This holds trivially for the links in F
that are not in T.L e te be a link of Cj which is in T. Then,
u(e) ≥ u(eij) and since at least half of its capacity is reserved
for protection, its protection capacity is at least u(eij)/2.
We now show that the network can recover from any single
link failure. As before, we show that if a link e, with working
trafﬁc w(e) is cut, then its bypass tunnel is able to support a
ﬂow of w(e) unit. We consider three cases for the failed link
e.
Let e =( u,v) not be in F. Thus, when e is considered
by the algorithm (while constructing F), u and v are 2-edge
connected. Hence, by construction, the two bypass tunnels for
e are two link disjoint paths in F between u and v. Consider
the graph formed by just the links in these two bypass tunnels.
It has some links which are not in T, and since they were
considered by the algorithm before link e, they all have at
least as much capacity as link e.L e te  be a link of T in
this graph. Since the end points of e  are 2-edge connected
(otherwise e  cannot be part of the bypass tunnel), the link e 
must be contained in some cycle where one of the links e” is
not in T. By design, since e” is not in T, we must have that the
capacity of e  is at least that of e”, which is at least as much
as the capacity of link e (since e” is considered before e by
the algorithm). Thus, each link on the two bypass tunnels, has
at least as much capacity as link e. But then, as shown before,
each of these links has at at least u(e)/2 capacity reserved
for protection. Hence half of link e’s working trafﬁc, can be
rerouted on each of the two bypass tunnels.
Next, let e =( u,v) be in F, but not in T. Then e = eij for
some j, in our notation presented earlier. Consider the cycle
Cj. The bypass tunnel for e is the path obtained by removing
link e from Cj. As shown earlier all the links of Cj have
at least u(eij)/2 capacity reserved for protection. Thus, the
entire working trafﬁc on link e, which is at most u(eij)/2,
can be rerouted over its bypass tunnel.
Finally, let e =( u,v) be in T, and hence in F. Then, there
exists some link eij in F, (but not in T) such that e is in
Cj(e), and the bypass tunnel for link e is the path, obtained
by removing link e from Cj. By construction the working
capacity of link e is u(eij)/2, and as shown earlier, all the links
of Cj have at least u(eij)/2 capacity reserved for protection.
Thus, the entire working trafﬁc on link e, can be rerouted over
its bypass tunnel.
C. Uniform Capacity Case: Practical Consideration
In the case when all the links have the same total capacity
(u(e)=u, for some integer u), then both the algorithms may
consider the links in any arbitrary order. The worst case guar-
antees, that we show later, hold for any such order. However,
in practice some orderings may be better than other ones. Here
we present a scheme based on one such ordering. Note that
when all links have the same capacity u, the algorithm sets
p(e)=u/2 for all links in F, and p(e)=0for all links
outside F. Thus, the amount of protection capacity reserved
by the algorithm, is directly proportional to the number of
links in the 2-edge connected graph F.
In order to minimize the number of links in the 2-edge
connected graph F, we propose the following algorithm. Let T
be obtained by doing a DFS on G. The algorithm to construct
F, starting from T, is modiﬁed as follows. At any step, the
algorithm considers that link e =( u,v) to add to F, for which,
u and v are not 2-edge connected in F, and the number of links
on the unique path from u to v in T, that are not in any cycle of
F, is maximized. We can show that the worst case performance
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However, in practice this algorithm ﬁnds solutions with lower
total protection capacity. As an example, consider the network
in Figure 1, with uniform link capacities. The DFS tree T,i s
shown in thick solid lines. The algorithm adds links (0,3)
and (1,2) (shown as thick dashed lines) to T, in that order,
to construct F. All these links in F have half their capacity
reserved for protection, and the remaining two links in G,h a v e
no capacity reserved for protection. Thus, the total protection
capacity reserved by the algorithm, is at most 16.7%m o r e
than the amount reserved by the optimal solution.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section we show that all the algorithms presented in
Section IV have good worst case performance. Speciﬁcally, we
show that these algorithms are guaranteed to ﬁnd a solution
with total protection capacity no more than twice that of the
optimal solution.
First we establish a lower bound on the amount of total
protection capacity that is needed by any solution.
A. Lower Bound
Let the network have n nodes denoted by the set V .L e t
δ(v) denote the set of links incident on node v.L e tt h e
maximum capacity of any link incident on node v be M(v).
Thus, M(v) = maxe∈δ(v) u(e).
Lemma 2: Any solution must reserve at least 
v∈V M(v)/2 total protection capacity on the links of
the network.
Proof: The following proof applies, even when there is
no limit on the number of bypass tunnels for the links, and
even when the working trafﬁc is split arbitrarily among the
bypass tunnels. Consider any solution. Let v be a node and
let e be a link of capacity u(e)=M(v), incident on node v.
On the failure of link e, the working trafﬁc on link e must be
rerouted over the remaining links in δ(v). Since, the working
trafﬁc of link e can be as large as u(e) − p(e),t h es u mo f
the protection capacities of the remaining links in δ(v) must
be at least u(e) − p(e). Thus, the total protection capacity on
all the links in δ(v) must be at least u(e) − p(e)+p(e)=
u(e)=M(v). Consider the sum 2

e p(e). Note that this
equals

v∈V

e∈δ(v) p(e) ≥

v∈V M(v). Thus,

e p(e) ≥ 
v∈V M(v)/2.
Corollary 3: When all links have the same capacity u(e)=
u, for all e, then at least un/2 total protection capacity is
reserved by any solution.
Now we show that the algorithms described earlier are 2-
approximation algorithms.
B. Algorithm based on spanning tree construction
Let T be the tree (forest) found by the algorithm. We ﬁrst
show that the total capacity of the links of T is at most 
v∈V M(v).
Lemma 4: The total capacity of the links in T is at most 
v∈V M(v).
Proof: The proof uses a charging argument, where the
capacity of each link in T is charged to at least one vertex in
V , such that the total capacity charged to each vertex v,i sa t
most M(v). This implies that the total capacity of the links of
T is at most

v∈V M(v). The charging works as follows. Let
u be some arbitrary vertex in V .L e tS be a subset of vertices,
which is initially set to S = {u}, and in the end is equal to
V . At each step the charging scheme picks one unpicked link
of T, that connects some vertex in S to some vertex not in
S. Note that such a link must always exist as long as there
is at least one unpicked link of T. Let the charging scheme
pick link e =( x,y) with x in S and y not in S. The capacity
of link e is charged to vertex y. Thus, y gets a charge of
u(y), which is at most M(y), since link e is one of the links
in δ(y). At this point S is set to S ∪{ y}, and the charging
scheme continues by picking another unpicked link from T,
that connects some vertex of S to some vertex not in S.N o t e
that in this charging scheme, each vertex is charged at most
once, since it is charged only when it is brought into S.A l s o ,
as shown above the charge on any vertex y is at most M(y),
thus establishing the result.
Theorem 5: The spanning tree based algorithm is a 2-
approximation algorithm,
Proof: Follows from Lemmas 2 and 4.
C. Algorithm based on 2-edge connected graph construction
Theorem 6: The algorithm based on 2-edge connected
graph construction is a 2-approximation algorithm,
Proof: Recall that this algorithm starts out with the tree
T, created by the ﬁrst algorithm and adds more links to it,
while adjusting the reserved protection capacity on the tree
links and the newly added links. As shown in Theorem 5, the
total protection capacity reserved (which is all on T)b yt h e
spanning tree based algorithm is at most twice the protection
capacity reserved by an optimal solution. By using a charging
argument, we show that as link protection capacities are
updated by this algorithm, the total protection capacity does
not increase, thus implying that the total protection capacity
of the solution output by this algorithm, is also at most twice
the protection capacity reserved by an optimal solution.
Let ei1,e i2,...e ik be the links added by the algorithm to
the tree T, arranged so that i1 >i 2 >...i k, and thus u(i1) ≤
u(i2) ≤ ...u(ik). Recall that as shown earlier, link ei1 is in a
cycle C1 in F1, all of whose other links are in T. Thus, link ei1
is the least capacity link on C1. As before, let C1(e) include
those links of C1 which are on a single cycle (C1)i nF.I n
addition, link ei1 is also in C1(e). Recall that the algorithm
increases the protection capacity of link ei1 by u(ei1)/2, while
at the same time decreasing the protection capacity of all other
links in C1(e) by u(ei1)/2 each.
We show that there is at least one link e ∈ T in C1(e).T h e
proof is by contradiction. If there is no such link e then just
before ei1 =( u,v) is added by the algorithm to F, each of
the link on the path joining u with v in T, is already in some
cycle. Thus, u and v are 2-edge connected just before link ei1
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would not add link ei1 to F, a contradiction.
The increase in the protection capacity of link ei1,i s
balanced out by an equal or larger decrease, in the protection
capacity of at least one link e ∈ T, which is in C1(e).
Similarly, the increase in the protection capacity of link ei2,
can be charged to an equal or larger decrease in the protection
capacity of some other link e ∈ T, which is in C2(e), and so
on. This holds for all links eij, that are added by the algorithm
to F. Also each link of e in T gets charged at most once, where
the charge on e is at most half its total capacity u(e). Thus,
the solution reserves no more than twice the total protection
capacity reserved by any optimal solution.
It can be shown that uniform capacity case given in Sec-
tion IV-C is also a 2-approximation algorithm.
D. NP-completeness result
In this section we show that even a simple version of the
problem is NP-complete.
Claim 7: For a given value P, the problem of determining
if there exists a solution that reserves at most P total protection
is NP-complete for k =2 . Furthermore, this holds even when
all u(e) are equal.
Proof: Note that given a solution to the problem (the
protection capacities on each link and the bypass tunnels for
each link), it can be veriﬁed in polynomial time if it is a
feasible solution for protecting against any single link failure,
and hence the problem is in NP.
Consider an instance of the problem for k =2with all edge
capacities u(e)=2 . In any solution to this problem, each links
working trafﬁc is rerouted (split equally into integral ﬂows) on
at most two bypass tunnels.
We reduce the problem of determining if there exists a
hamiltonian circuit in a given connected graph to this problem.
The reduction sets P = n and sets every link capacity to 2.
We claim that the given connected graph has a hamiltonian
circuit if and only if the reduced instance has a solution of
total protection capacity at most n. Let the graph have a
hamiltonian circuit. We set p(e)=w(e)=1 , for all links e in
the hamiltonian circuit, and we set p(e)=0and w(e)=2 ,f o r
all the other links e. Note that this solution has total protection
capacity exactly n = P. Each link e in the hamiltonian circuit
has a single bypass tunnel, which is the hamiltonian path
obtained by removing e from the hamiltonian circuit.
A link (u,v) which is not on the hamiltonian circuit has
two bypass tunnels, corresponding to the two paths connecting
node u to v in the hamiltonian circuit. Thus, the bypass tunnels
only use the links of the hamiltonian circuit, each of which
has one unit of capacity reserved for protection. It is easy to
see that this is a feasible solution.
The proof in the other direction works as follows. Let the
optimal solution of the reduced instance reserve at most P
total protection capacity. Note that by Corollary 3, any solution
to this instance must use at least n = P protection capacity.
Hence the optimal solution must use exactly P = n protection
capacity. Consider any link e with p(e)=2in the optimal
solution. Let e =( u,v). Then it must be the case that no
other link e  incident on node u or node v can have p(e ) > 0
in this solution. This is because, as shown in the proof of
Lemma 2, for every node w we have P(w) ≥ M(w)=2 ,
where P(w) is the total protection capacity on the links
incident on node w (links in δ(w)). Thus, if some link e , other
than link (u,v), incident on say node u has p(e ) > 0 then
P(u) > 2. In that case, the total protection capacity reserved
by the solution, which is shown in the proof of Lemma 2 as
at least

v P(v)/2, would be strictly greater than n, leading
to a contradiction. Thus, neither node u or node v can have
another link e incident on it, with p(e) > 0. A consequence
of this is that no bypass tunnel, in the optimal solution, can
contain a link e for which p(e)=2 . This is because a bypass
tunnel must have at least two links, each with strictly positive
protection capacity reserved on it. Thus, a link e with p(e)=2
is not useful to any solution, implying that by setting p(e)=0 ,
we can decrease the cost of the optimal solution, while not
changing its feasibility. Thus, there must not exist any links e
with p(e)=2in the optimal solution.
A similar argument shows that, in the optimal solution, for
any node v there are at most two links e in δ(v) with p(e)=1 .
Let S be the set of links with p(e)=1 , in the optimal solution.
Since, there are no links with p(e)=2in the optimal solution,
we must have that the number of links in S is exactly n.N o t e
that the graph formed by the links in S is connected, since
all the bypass tunnels must only use links in S. Therefore,
if it has two or more connected components, say S1 and S2,
then since the original graph is connected, there must exist
a link e which is not in S, with one endpoint in S1 and the
other endpoint in S2 with w(e)=2 . Note that link e is not
protected in the optimal solution, and hence such an e does
not exist. Moreover, the graph formed by links in S is 2-edge
connected. This is because, otherwise the working trafﬁc (of
one unit) on the failure of a cut-link e of S cannot be routed
over the protection capacities on the surviving links (remaining
links in S).
The only possible solution with these properties for S (n
links and 2-edge connected) is that the links of S must form
a hamiltonian circuit. Thus showing that the given graph must
have a hamiltonian circuit.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
So far, we have looked at the problem of computing the
initial set of protection capacities and bypass tunnels, to be
pre-provisioned in a network at startup. These initial set of val-
ues may be pre-provisioned in the network by a management
system. Subsequent updates to these, to deal with changes in
topology, may be performed by the network in conjunction
with the management system. To this end, the reserved link
protection capacities may be advertised as part of the LSA.
In order to ensure there is no over-subscription of protection
bandwidth, the bypass tunnels may be pre-provisioned, in the
network, with zero bandwidth each [20].
Next, we consider topology changes and describe our al-
gorithm to deal with them. The algorithm computes updated
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change. We assume a central server model for computing
the updated values, where the server is implemented as a
Label Switch Router (LSR) in the MPLS network [20]. The
algorithm can be modiﬁed, to operate in a distributed imple-
mentation. However, for ease of exposition we will assume a
centralized model.
The LSR server monitors the LSA updates from the network
to identify changes in topology. Following a topology change,
it re-computes the new solution and updates the network with
the new solution. For ease of presentation, we only describe the
high level ideas, for two basic topology update operations: the
addition of a link and the deletion of a link. In the following,
we will assume k =2 . The case when at most one bypass
tunnel is allowed per link can be similarly handled.
When a new link e =( u,v) is added, the only update
to the solution is the protection capacity and the bypass
tunnel for link e. The amount of protection capacity reserved
on e depends on how much protection capacity is currently
available between nodes u and v in the network. This can be
determined using a max-ﬂow computation on the protection
capacities of the links of the network. Depending on how
much protection capacity is available, the algorithm computes
a lower bound on the amount of protection capacity to be
reserved on the link. Having determined a lower bound on
the protection capacity for link e, and hence an upper bound
on the working capacity of link e, the algorithm attempts to
maximize the amount of working capacity (upto the upper
bound) that can be assigned to link e, without changing any
other links protection or working capacity. To test whether a
given amount w of working capacity can be assigned to the
link, the algorithm solves a max ﬂow problem on an auxiliary
unit capacity graph. In addition to determining if w is feasible,
the max ﬂow computation also yields the (at most two) bypass
tunnels for link e when w is used as working capacity on
link e. Next, to maximize the working capacity w that can be
assigned to link e (upto the upper bound), the algorithm uses
a binary search on the range of allowed values for w.
Next we consider the case when a link e is deleted from the
network. The easy case is when none of the bypass tunnels of
any of the surviving links contains link e. In this case there is
nothing to be done. However, note that even if a bypass tunnel
of link e  contains link e, link e  may still be protected in the
new network, since there may exist another bypass tunnel for
link e  using only the protection capacities of the surviving
links. In this case only the bypass tunnels for link e  need
to be updated. This can be done easily by considering e  to
be a newly added link to the new network and then by using
the procedure described earlier, for the link addition case, to
determine whether link e  can be assigned a working capacity
of w(e ). Note that this way, the new bypass tunnels for link
e  can also be computed. Now consider the case when there is
at least one link e  which is not protected in the new network.
In this case, the protection capacities of other links have to
be updated as well. Note that, the amount of slack on a link,
for the protection capacity, is the difference of its working
capacity and the amount of working trafﬁc currently being
carried by the link. This gives an upper bound on how much
the links protection capacity can be increased. The algorithm
for updating the links protection capacity operates in two
phases. In the ﬁrst phase, all the link protection capacities
are uniformly increased (including link e ), to their upper
bound, until all links e  are protected. In the second phase,
the algorithm lowers the protection capacity of those links that
have a slack in their protection capacity. Finally, the algorithm
updates the bypass tunnels for all the links.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
To measure the performance of our algorithms, we did
extensive simulations using various real and simulated net-
works. Here we only present the results for four standard
networks. However, the presented results are typical of all
our simulations. The results are presented for ARPANET
(Figure 3), NJ LATA (Figure 4), National (Figure 5) and the
European Cost239 (Figure 6) networks. We ran our algorithms
on these networks, both with uniform link capacities and with
randomly chosen non-uniform link capacities. In the non-
uniform case the link capacities range from 20 to 40.W e
use, as a benchmark, the solution to a linear program that
models our problem without the constraint on the number
of bypass tunnels or their minimum bandwidth requirement.
Note that, since the linear program models a problem with
fewer constraints, its optimal solution is a lower bound on
the optimal solution to our problem. Our main observations
are summarized in Table I. As an example, we describe these
results, for the NJ LATA network. This network has 11 nodes
(column II) and 23 links (column III). For the uniform link
capacity case we normalize the results so that each links
capacity is exactly one unit. In this case the LP (a lower bound
on the optimal solution) reserves 6 (column VII) out of the
23 units of total link capacity for protection. The algorithm
based on 2-edge connected subgraph, when optimized with
the DFS tree approach, ﬁnds an optimal solution of total
protection capacity 6 (column VI) units, which is 26%o f
the total link capacity. Recall, that any ring based approach
(e.g. SONET) would reserve at least 50% of the capacity
for protection. The other non-optimized algorithm based on
2-edge connected subgraph also obtains an optimal solution
(column V). The tree algorithm reserves 10 (column IV)
units of protection capacity (43.5% of the total link capacity
and at most 1.67 times the amount reserved by the optimal
solution). For non-uniform capacities, the optimal solution
reserves at least 188 (column XI) out of a total 610 (column
VIII) units of capacity for protection. The algorithm based
on 2-edge connected graph, ﬁnds a solution which reserves
236 (column X) units of protection capacity (which is at most
1.26 times the optimal solution). For the tree based algorithm,
this number is 306 (column IX), which is at most 1.63 times
the optimal solution. In summary, for the uniform capacity
case, the optimized 2-edge algorithm has solution comparable
to the optimal algorithm. The 2-edge algorithm, in general,
ﬁnds a solution, which is at most 1.5 times the optimal
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solution. The tree based algorithm, ﬁnds a solution which
ranges approximately between 1.6 to 1.9 times the optimal
solution.
VIII. EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
There has been some work on survivability of networks
against mulitiple link failures [3][17][4]. So far, we have
presented our results, for the basic version of the problem,
where we want to protect against a single link failure and
the links are bidirectional and symmetric in both direction.
However, our results also extend to the case where we want
to protect against multiple failures, and when the links are
unidirectional. The two algorithms for dealing with t>1 link
failures works very much the same way as the algorithm for
the single link failure, except it computes t different graphs
T1,T 2,...T t (F1,F 2,...F t), instead of just a single graph T
(F), such that no pair of graphs Ti and Tj (Fi and Fj) share
any links. Thus a bypass tunnel, computed using one of these
graphs, is link disjoint from a bypass tunnel computed using
any other graph. The protection capacities and bypass tunnels
(there can be 2t of these per link), are determined in very
Fig. 5. The National network
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much the same way, as for the single link case. We are able
to show that these two algorithms are also 2-approximation
for protecting against any t failures, and they compute a
solution in which, even after t failures in the network, each
links working trafﬁc can be routed on its “surviving” bypass
tunnels. If we make the realistic assumption that link failures
are spaced apart, so that there is enough time for LSA updates
to reach every LSR between link failures, then every LSR is
able to locally determine its surviving bypass tunnels without
any signaling or routing modiﬁcations. Thus, the scheme can
be efﬁciently implemented in the existing MPLS networks.
The uni-directional links are also handled in very much the
same way as the bi-directional links. The only modiﬁcation is
that the underlying networks is now a directed graph, instead
of an undirected graph. We leave the details of these extensions
for the full paper.
Note that our scheme is mainly designed for dealing with
link failures. However, node and SRLG (shared risk link
group) failures are also a common occurrence, and fast reroute
based schemes to protect against these failures are also very
appealing. We would like to extend our algorithms to node
and SRLG failures.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Pre-provisioning of protection capacities and bypass tunnels
provides a way of achieving fast shared restoration in mesh
networks. We presented efﬁcient approximation algorithms for
minimizing the amount of pre-provisioned protection capaci-
ties, while supporting at most two bypass tunnels per link.
With simulations on standard networks, we showed that our
algorithms works well in practice. Finally, we also showed
how topology updates can be handled in our framework.
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